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Abstract
This paper studies the conditions under which intra-elite conict leads to a democ-
racy. There are two risk averse elites competing for the appropriation of a unit of so-
cial surplus, with an ex-ante uncertainty about their future relative bargaining power,
and a large non-elite class unable to act collectively. We characterize a democracy as
consistng of both franchise extension to, and lowering the cost of collective political
activity for, individuals in the non-elite. In the absence of democracy, the stronger
elite is always able to appropriate the entire surplus. We show that in a democ-
racy, the newly enfranchised non-elite organize and always prefer to form a coalition
with weaker elite against the stronger resulting in a more balanced surplus allocation
between the two elites. Accordingly, the elites choose to democratize if they are suf-
ciently risk averse. Our formal analysis can account for stylized facts that emerge
from a comparative analysis of Indian and Western European democracies.
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1 Introduction
Can a democracy emerge as a solution to intra-elite conict? Moore (1964) argues that a
fundamental precondition for stable democracy is a balance of power between landed upper
class and urban bourgeoisie, while totalitarian regimes arise whenever one class dominates
the others. Olson (1993) notes: We can deduce (...) that autocracy is prevented and
democracy permitted by the accidents of history that leave a balance of power or stalemate-
a dispersion of force or resources that makes it impossible for any leader or group to
overpower all of the others. And Collier (1999) underlines the central role of political
or economic elitesbargaining in almost all processes of transition to democracy. Along
similar lines, Bardhan (1984) argues that in a democracy one elite can use the threat of
coalition formation with the ordinary people to stabilizes the relative bargaining power
with the other elite. In particular he notes:
Populist rhetoric has been a useful weapon in clipping the wings of an over-
greedy bargaining partner [...] profuse tears of commiseration with the masses
[...] have drowned a rivals extravagant claims. If the industrialists at any time
overstep in their bargaining, sure enough there will be an uproar in the Par-
liament about the anti-people conspiracy of the monopoly capitalists; similar
invectives against the kulaksor, somewhat less frequently, against the para-
sitic intelligentsiawill also be aired on appropriate occasions. The competitive
politic of democracy thus serves the purpose of keeping rival partners in the
coalition on the defensive(P. Bardhan 1984 pp. 77).
Two examples, drawn from the histories of Indian and French democracy, are a useful
illustration of the mechanism emphasized above by Bardhan. In India, Indira Gandhis
attempt to mount a coup (by imposing "Emergency") in 1975 culminated with the lost of
the enormous popular support she had hitherto enjoyed. Even though she promised more
redistribution to the non elite, this commitment was not credible and an alliance consisting
of the non-elite with anti-Congress parties ercely opposed her by organizing a large mass
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mobilization (e.g. Kohli (2001)).1
In France, universal male su¤rage was introduced in 1848. When a social reform agenda
was passed thanks to the alliance between the working class and Republicans, a conservative
government disenfranchised 2.8 million of men in 1850. However, in 1851 the Republicans
and the working class supported the coup led by Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, who restored
the universal su¤rage, initially only formally and from 1868, under the pressure of Repub-
licans and working classes more substantially ( also by abolishing the previously imposed
ban on organized political activity (Collier 1999, pp. 42-43 and Elwitt pp. 41).
Starting from the above observations and examples, we aim to study how a democracy
can be an e¤ective device to manage intra-elite conicts.
We analyze a model where two risk averse elites compete for the appropriation of a
unit of social surplus, with an ex-ante uncertainty about their future relative bargaining
power, and a non-elite class, large but unable to act collectively. Ex-post, after the elites
relative bargaining power is revealed, the stronger elite can appropriate the available surplus
in any bilateral bargain, hence neither of the two elites are able to make a credible ex-
ante commitment on a balanced ex-post division of social surplus. We show that in a
democracy, the newly enfranchised non-elite always organize collectively and always form
a coalition with weaker elite in case of disenfranchisement threat. This coalition formation
strategy partially balances the relative bargaining power between the two elites, hence the
democratization is an ex-ante dominant choice for both the elites if they are su¢ ciently
risk averse.
The model emphasizes that the insurance mechanism outlined above is e¤ective only if
the non elite is able to act collectively as a group to acquire non-trivial bargaining power,
otherwise franchise extension on its own does not alter the balance of power between the two
elites. Accordingly, we show that extending the franchise and lowering the cost of political
participation (for example by legalizing political parties) for the initially disorganized non-
elite are both necessary to solve the non-elite collective action problem and thus to change
the democratic surplus allocation.
1A proof of the general lost of support for Ghandi is also her defeat in the 1977 election, won by the
Janata Party.
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In our model, collective political activity is organized by a political party who is able
to reward its own members selectively.2 We assume that two elites are already organized
along party lines whereas the non-elite are initially disorganized. We model party formation
within the non-elite explicitly by allowing each individual in the non-elite the choice of
becoming a party member. In our model, joining the party is costly and becomes a dominant
strategy for an individual if and only if the number of other individuals joining the party is
greater than the critical mass required for e¤ective political activity. Therefore the party
formation process has two equilibria, one where all individuals join the party and the second
where no individual joins the party.
Which equilibrium do non-elite individuals coordinate on? An individual member of
the non-elite contrasts the consequences of not joining the party with the risk of loosing
out from the gains of party membership if a critical mass of other individuals join the
partyand the consequences of joining the party with risk of incurring a privately borne
cost if the number of other individuals joining the party falls below the critical mass. The
selection argument we use here picks the equilibrium with the lower risk of utility loss.3
In our model, the cost of joining the party determines the critical mass required for
e¤ective political activity. A democracy lowers the required critical mass by lowering the
cost of joining the party. This ensures that individuals in the non-elite coordinate on the
equilibrium that leads to party formation.
Once the non elite become organized as a group, it strictly prefers to form a coalition
with weaker elite in order not to be expropriated by the stronger elite. Thus coalition
formation in ex-post bargaining changes the incentives of the stronger elite to renegotiate
the surplus allocation achieved by majority voting. In this sense, a democracy endogenously
constrains the ability of elites to grab the available social surplus and results in a more
balanced surplus allocation between the two elites. Moreover, since agreements are never
binding, even in democracythe threat of renegotiation and coalition formation by the two
2Such a commitment to a selective reward, as Olson (1965) originally pointed out, is a common solution
to the free-riding problem involved in collective action.
3We build on the Harsanyi and Selten (1988)s concept of risk dominance and Young (1993). One way
to gain intuition about our equilibrium selection argument is by relating the party formation process to the
stag-hare hunting game (Rousseau, 1754). Rousseau uses the game to contrast the gains of hunting hare,
where the risk of non-cooperation is small and the reward equally small, against the gains of hunting the
stag, where maximum cooperation is required and the risk of non-cooperation is greater but the reward is
much greater.
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elites also limits how much of the available surplus the median voter (belonging to the non
elite) allocates to herself. When the degree of risk aversion of the two elites is large enough,
it is ex-ante payo¤ dominant for both elites to choose democracy essentially for insurance
motives.
In conclusion, the mechanism of conict resolution of the democracy described by our
model has two main implications that we think are new in the literature. First in a
democracy the freedom of political participation is necessary as the right to vote; the
enfranchisement with a high cost of political participation would not change the oligarchic
equilibrium allocation. This point is consistent with the observation that all constitutions
of the countries commonly considered democratic explicitly recognize freedom of collective
organization as well as the universal right to vote (in the last section we provide a sample of
the relevant articles concerning freedom of organization). Furthermore, political scientists
have documented that in many dictatorships individuals have the right to vote (and often
massively participate in elections) without having real freedom of association,4 and that
criteria used to dene democracies must include not just the right to vote, but also the
existence of e¤ective collective political organizations.5
Second, the surplus that the median voter belonging to the non elite after the enfran-
chisement allocates to herself in the democratic equilibrium is bounded by the threat of
renegotiation and coalition by the two elites: in fact, it can be very small and can never
be too high. This point seems to nd some support from Aidt, Dutta and Loukoianova
(2006), who nd evidence of little or no redistribution to the working classes in the post-
enfrachisement experience of western European countries;6 and from the Indian experience
where high and widespread poverty and low level of public good provision have coexisted
with the democracythe so called Indian puzzle (e.g. Weiner (2001)).7
4Przeworski et Al. (2000) classies dictatorship with the elections as "mobilizing dictatorship". In
their database, containing observation in the period 1950-90, there are 147 mobilizing over a total of 274
di¤erent dictatorships.
5E.g. Hermert (1978) and Dahl (1989).
6Also De Mello and Tiongson (2003) recently found evidence that more unequal societies tend to spend
less rather than more in redistribution.
7A possible objection to our argument is that stable democracy is not a necessary outcome of intra-elite
conict in heterogenous societies as in many African countries. In an extension to the main model, we
consider scenarios where, due to linguistic or ethnic di¤erences, there are vertical links between one elite
and a section of the non-elite. With such vertical links, we show that a vertical bias in coalition formation
between elites and sections of the non-elite could indeed prevent democratization.
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1.1 Related Literature
To the best of our knowledge the idea that a democracy represents a solution of the collec-
tive action problem faced by the large non elite has never been explicitly formalized.8 A
similar idea is present in the non formal political science literature. For example Epstein
(1967, p. 19) already notes that modern political parties [i.e. di¤erent from a restricted
group of friends] emerged with the extension of the vote to a fairly large proportion of
the populace. Moreover, our emphasis on the e¤ect democratic institutions, in shap-
ing individual incentives to act collectively is similar to the notion of political opportunity
structure in the sociology literature (see e.g. Tilly (1978), McAdam (1992), Tarrow (1998)).
The latter concept is based on the idea that the state with its institution determined the
opportunity of the collective action.9
The notion that for a collective action problem solution is necessary a critical mass
of individuals can be traced back in the sociology literature as well (Oliver, Marwel and
Teixeira 1985). Our contribution on this issue is to show how democratization can act as
an equilibrium selection device by decreasing this critical mass.
Recently, Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2007) addressed the problem of coalition for-
mation and conict in a non democratic society and analyzed the existence and the charac-
teristic of an ultimate ruling coalition in a context where no binding agreement are feasible.
In our paper, we assume that in a democracy (as well as in an oligarchy) agreements can
be renegotiated, allowing us to emphasize the necessity in democracy of party formation
with the aim of avoiding renegotiations.
The issue of how constraining are the agreements in a democratic context has been
also addressed by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), who distinguish between de jure and
de facto political power and point out that franchise extension- seen as the allocation of
de jure power to working class- can have little impact on economic institutions, given that
elites actively invest in holding onto de facto power. In our model, we show that two de
8Acemoglu and Robinson (2006a) p. 179 provide an informal discussion on the role of political par-
ticipation in shaping real constraints for the elites in the period in the post enfrachisment period in the
UK.
9For example, Tarow (1998), p. 20, argues that:contentious Politics emerges when ordinary citizens,
(...), responds to opportunity that lowers the cost of collective action, reveal potential allies, show where
elites and authorities are most vulnerable and trigger social networks and collective identities into action
around common themes.
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jure agreements (i.e. enfranchisement and parties legalization) can have a real impactvia
collective actionon the non elite and weaker elite de facto power. Therefore we emphasize
how democratization is more than a de jure act of franchise extension.
The impossibility of exogenously binding agreements in a democratic context also dif-
ferentiate our paper from the initial contributions on enfranchisement that in the economic
literature started with Justman and Gradstein (1999), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000,
2001), Conley and Temini (2001), Bertocchi and Spagat (2001). These papers view the
transition to democracy as consisting of franchise extension as a non renegotiable agree-
ment,10 where the elites commit to relinquish under threat of revolution some power to the
non elite.
Other relevant contributions modelling the enfranchisement as an exogenous commit-
ment are: Fleck and Hanssen (2002) and Gradstein (2006), where enfranchisement is a
commitment not to expropriate the non elites; Lizzeri and Persico (2004) where elites en-
franchise the non elite to commit on an e¢ cient supply public goods, and Laguno¤ and
Jack (2005) where pivotal voters commit to future policy choices. Our paper di¤ers from all
above mentioned papers since the cost of renegotiating the voting outcome is endogenous
and it is high when the non elite is able to act collectively.11
The rest of the paper is organized as it follows. In section 2, we present the main model
and results. Section 3 analyzes some extensions of the model to analyze when the between-
elites conict does not lead to democratization. Section 4 is devoted to the discussion, using
our model and its results, of comparative historical and institutional evidence relating to
India and the pattern of democratization in some Western European countries. Section 5
o¤ers some nal remarks. Some of the more technical material is contained in the appendix.
2 The model
We study a three time period (t = 0; 1; 2) model with three classes of homogeneous agents,
E1; E2;W , where Ei, i = 1; 2, denotes the two elites and W represents the numerically
10Or it is renegotiable at an exogenously given cost like in Acemoglu and Robinson (2001).
11Llavador and Oxoby (2005) and Galor and Moav (2006) are also related. By using a macroeconomic
approach, they argue that democratization is the consequence of the interest alignments between social
classes, ultimately generated by factorscomplementarity and economic growth.
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large non-elite. The total number of individuals has a mass of 1 + 2; the mass of W is
equal to 1 and the mass of each elite is equal to ; and 2 < 1: There is a measure of
disposable social surplus normalized to one, and the three group compete to appropriate
the social surplus; the portion of surplus appropriated by each class is invested to provide
a class-specic collective good, which is consumed at time 2: Preferences over consumption
of the collective good are represented by the smooth utility function u : <+ ! < where
u0(:) > 0 > u00(:) i.e. agents are strictly risk averse and payo¤ are normalized so that
u(0) = 0.
The two elites E1 and E2 are assumed to be initially organized: each individual in
E1 and E2 can credibly commit to act collectively and invest the acquired surplus in the
collective good for all its members. In contrast, the non-elite W is initially completely
disorganized so that no individual in W can commit to act collectively. Only individuals
who act collectively are able to appropriate a portion of the disposable surplus since single
atomless individuals have no power of surplus extraction against organized group, formed
by a positive mass. In order to act collectively, each individual has to join an organization
(a party) and we assume that party membership for the non elites has a privately borne
participation utility sunk-cost c for each individual.12 This cost is xed at time 0 by the
elite by legalizing (or even facilitating) the political activity, in a range c 2 (c;1] , with
c  0:
The non elite party can commit to invest in the collective good for its members (exactly
like the two organized elites) and exclude the non members from the benet of the good.13
Let W  denote a situation where there is a fraction  of individuals in W who join the
party so that  is a measure of the level of organization in W; with higher values of 
denoting a higher level of organization.
At t = 0, the two elites, by unanimous consent, choose whether democratize or staying
in a situation of Oligarchy. In Oligarchy only E1 and E2 decide the surplus division by
majority voting at time 1. By contrast, democratization implies:
a) Enfranchisement of each individual in W , so that she has right to vote at t = 1;
12We can think of it as an initial cost to get in touch and establish a communication channel with the
other members.
13This is a simplifying assumption. We could more realistically assume that the party can allocate some
surplus privately to each member, while some other surplus can be invested in a public non excludable
good for all individuals in W without a¤ecting qualitatively our results.
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b) Legalizing collective political activity for individuals in W by lowering the privately
borne cost of party membership to a minimal level c = c.
The relative power of E1 and E2 is uncertain at t = 0 and is determined at t = 1 by ,
a random variable, where
 =
8<: 1 prob. q2 prob. 1  q :
The interpretation is that when  = i, elite Ei can appropriate the entire unit of disposable
surplus in any bilateral bargain with Ej and with W 1:14 In the appendix, we endogenize
the bargaining power by deriving it from the disagreement point that can be seen as the
surplus one group can appropriate in case of civil war.15
The variable q can be interpreted as an index of power between the two elites, so
that when q = 1
2
, the two elites are symmetric and neither is dominant. For expositional
simplicity, we initially solve the model under the case q = 1
2
, then in section 3.2, we study
the consequences of relaxing this assumption.
Some notation is now necessary. Let   denote the set of all admissible coalitions between
E1; E2 and W; excluding the grand coalition.16 For each  2  , let   () denote the set of
admissible coalitions which excludes any class already contained in :17 We assume that in
any process of bargaining between two classes or between a class and a coalition of classes,
the outcome is determined by a grabbing function g(; 0; ) measuring the share of the
available surplus  is able to extract in a bilateral bargain with 0 2   () given . For
 2  , 0 2   (), the interpretation is that in any bilateral bargain, bargaining power is
equivalent to the amount of the available surplus that  can grab relative to 0; clearly,
g(; 0; ) = 1   g(0; ; ). Conditional on  = i, Ei is the stronger elite therefore by
denition g(Ei; Ej; i) = g(Ei;W 1; i) = 1:18
14Our results would not change qualitatively if we partially relax this assumption by allowing both W 1
and Ej to extract some surplus from the strongest elite, as long as this amount is small enough.
15Therefore, one can think at  as a shock increasing the value of the production factor owned by one
elite (like an increase of oil price or a dramatic factor intensive technological shocks), so that the elite
blessed by nature can then use this wealth to acquire guns or hire an army in order to extract the social
surplus.
16More formally:   = ffWg ; fE1g ; fE2g ; fW; E1g ; fW; E2g ; fE1; E2gg
17Formally, for any two classes i; j 2 ,   () = f0 2   : i =2 0 or j =2 0g.
18We di¤er from standard models of coalition formation in that the payo¤ to a member of a coalition
is determined by a process of bargaining. In the main text, we treat the grabbing function g(; 0; ) as a
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Moreover, we will assume that the more organized W is (i.e. the larger ), the higher
is its bargaining power against the weaker elite and the bargaining power of the coalition
between weaker elite and non eliteboth
g (fW ; Ejg ; Ei; i) and g(W ; Ej; i) are increasing in : (1)
Moreover, note that our above assumptions implies lim!0 g(W ; Ej; i) = 0.
We assume that at time t = 0 it is not possible to make binding agreements over surplus
division, which will then depend on the ex-post bargaining relative power between classes
and coalitions.
At t = 1, the relative bargaining strength of the two elites becomes common knowledge.
The pool of enfranchised individuals (everybody in democracy, only the elite in oligarchy),
by majority voting, decide a surplus allocation for each of the three classes.
At t = 2, either one of the two elites on their own or any other coalition of classes may
reject the voting outcome and renegotiate the surplus allocation determined by majority
voting at t = 1. Consumption takes place at the end of t = 2:
In the next section, we solve this model by backward induction.
2.1 Renegotiation and coalition formation at t = 2
At t = 2, after the outcome of majority voting is rejected the renegotiation phase takes
place. If no non-elite party formation took place at t = 1, i.e.  = 0; the payo¤distribution
at t = 2 is trivial: the stronger elite Ei obtains 1, Ej and each member of W obtain 0.
Next we consider if at time 1 there was party formation,  > 0. Note that at this time,
the order by which the groups or coalition of groups bargain between each other change
according to the identity of the group or coalition rejecting the democratic outcome.19 As
primitive; however, in the appendix, we endogenize this grabbing function via a process of recursive Nash
bargaining where the power of a class or coalition of classes is determined by the surplus each group or
coalition is able to appropriate in case of civil war.
19More in details:
1. If a single class has objected, the two classes who did not object decide whether or not to form a
coalition. If no coalition is formed, the objecting class bargains rst with one and then with the
other, and each class has an equal probability of being the rst.
2. If two classes form a coalition to reject the winning proposal, rst, the coalition bargains with the
excluded class and then, bargain with each other over the surplus appropriated in the preceding
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it will be clear in what follows, the nal payo¤s are independent on whom rejected the
democratic outcome.
Let f() denote the nal surplusW is able to appropriate after forming a coalition with
Ej against Ei and then bargaining with Ej on its own, or
f() = g (fW ; Ejg ; Ei; i) g(W ; Ej; i):
Given assumptions (1) f() is increasing in ; note moreover that lim!0 f() = 0.
Given that g(Ei;W 1; i) = 1, no individual (whether or not a party member) in W  will
obtain any share of the available surplus if it joins a coalition with the stronger elite.20
Therefore neither W nor Ej will form a coalition with the stronger elite Ei: On the other
hand, if  > 0, each party member in W  will have an incentive to form a coalition with
Ej; and Ej will have an incentive to form a coalition with W .
It follows that when  > 0, the payo¤ to Ei is 1 g (fW ; Ejg ; Ei; i), the payo¤ to Ej is
g () = g (fW ; Ejg ; Ei; i) g(Ej;W ; i) and the payo¤ each individual inW is f(): Hence,
whoever objected the democratic outcome (i.e.   (W ) given that W alone will never have
incentive to reject his own decision), there will always be a coalition formed by Ej and W;
rst bargaining against Ei; and then splitting the grabbed surplus among each other in a
post coalition bargaining.
As the degree of organization only a¤ect payo¤s at the renegotiation stage, at time 2,
the payo¤ to each individual in W belonging to the party of size  is u(f())   c while
the payo¤ from not joining the organization is 0. As u(0) = 0 and u(:) is continuous and
lim!0 f() = 0, lim!0 u(f()) = 0. Moreover, as u0(:) > 0, and f() is continuous and
increasing in , u(f()) is also continuous and increasing in .
Therefore, assuming that c is su¢ ciently small, so that
c < u(f(1)); (2)
which represents a necessary condition for the party formation in W:21 There will always
round of bargaining.
20For this reason, anticipating a coalition with the stronger elite, for each individual inW it is a dominant
strategy not to join the party (and pay a participation cost c > 0).
21Note that this condition implies that the non elite is able to extract some surplus from the weaker elite
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be a function ^(c); implicitly dened as u(f(^)) = c, such that it is a dominant action for
each individual in W to join the party if and only if  > ^(c). Let us dene ^(c) a critical
mass and we note that since ^0(c) > 0 , the elites can ex-ante decrease c; and therefore the
critical mass for the party formation, by legalizing the political activity.
2.2 Equilibrium enfranchisement
In this section, we study: (i) surplus division at t = 1, the voting stage; (ii) the ex-ante
decision of individuals in W to form a party at t = 0; (iii) the ex-ante decision of the two
elites to extend democracy at t = 0.
Voting at t = 1
Fix  = i. Let  =
 
Ei ; Ej ; W

denote a surplus sharing rule where Ei (respectively,
Ej) is the portion of the surplus appropriated by Ei (respectively, Ej) and W is the
portion of the surplus appropriated by W . If there is no democracy,  = 0 and the only
possible surplus division is Ei = 1, Ej = W 0 = 0 as any other division will be rejected
by the strongest elite. With democracy, the median voter is in W and the winning sharing
rule is Ei = 1   g ()   f (), Ej = g () and W = f (): by backward induction, if
W > f (), either of the two elites will object and following such an objection, W  will
form a coalition with Ej and obtain f ().
It is important to note that both the voting stage and the enfranchisement of W are
necessary to guarantee a di¤erent surplus allocation than in the oligarchy, in spite of the
fact that the democratic surplus division mirrors the renegotiation payo¤s. If the two elites
legalize W 0s organization but do not extend franchise, there will not be party formation in
equilibrium. Assume on the contrary that  > 0. Then, the equilibrium surplus sharing
would be Ei = 1   g (), Ej = g () and W = 0 as surplus division will exclude the
non-elite while ensuring that the weaker elite will extract g() by threatening to form a
coalition with W  at the renegotiation stage but ex-ante no individual in W  would ever
join the organization since W = 0.
Party formation at t = 0
Recall that any member of W can join the organization at cost c; and that (a) if an
in the post coalition game. Since c can be chosen arbitrarily small or even 0, the amount of surplus that
the non elite can extract can be arbitrarily small, but strictly positive.
12
individual in W believes that a fraction  > (c) will join the party, it is dominant for him
to join as well, (b) if he believes that there is fraction  < (c) joining the party, then it is
a dominant action for him not to join as well.
In a democracy, collective political organization is legal and any member of W can join
the organization at cost c; with ^(c) representing the critical mass in democracy. Note
that in democracy there are two symmetric equilibria in the collective action game being
played by individuals in W : one where no individual in W joins the party and another
where every individual in W will join the party.
Which of these two equilibria prevail? We develop an equilibrium selection argument
that selects the prevailing equilibrium as a function of c, the cost collective political activity
with enfranchisement. Specically, we show that without enfranchisement, the no party
equilibrium is selected while with enfranchisement, the party equilibrium is selected.
Lemma 1 In the party formation game played by individuals in W , the equilibrium where
everybody joins the party is selected if and only if ^(c) < 1
2
.
Proof. See the appendix.
The key premise underlying the equilibrium selection argument used here (Harsanyi
and Selten (1988) and Young (1993)) is that individuals in W face strategic uncertainty as
there are multiple strict Nash equilibria in the party formation game. Although Youngs
original argument was couched in an evolutionary context, we follow Charness and Jackson
(2007) in reinterpreting the equilibrium selection argument as a recursive eductive (mental)
process of where each individual assesses the likelihood of other individuals choosing actions
according to either equilibrium, under the assumption that other individuals make a small
mistake with some small probability and choose their own actions optimally. The selected
equilibrium is the one which is relatively more robust to individual mistakes namely the
one with a larger basin of attraction. Therefore, when ^(c) is small, individuals converge
on the equilibrium where all individuals join the party. In the language of Harsanyi and
Selten (1988), the selected equilibrium is risk-dominant.
Finally note that ^(c) is an increasing function of c; and therefore, the condition that
^(c) < 1
2
can be equivalently stated as a condition that c is low enough. The following
lemma summarizes the above discussion:
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Proposition 1 . If the cost of joining a party in democracy, c; is su¢ ciently low, all
individuals in W will join the party anticipating coalition formation with the weaker of the
two elites at the renegotiation stage and a share f () at the voting stage.
Furthermore, always using lemma 1 and considering the above discussion we can state
the following:
Proposition 2 Both lowering the cost of joining the party to a level c such that ^(c) < 1
2
and the enfranchisement are necessary to achieve a surplus sharing di¤erent than the one
in oligarchy.
Proof. We already argued aboveduring the illustration of the voting stagethe necessity
of extending the franchise. Now, let us consider an hypothetical situation where two elites
extend franchise but do not lower the cost of joining the organization, so that c : ^(c) > 1
2
.
Given lemma 1  = 0 and the surplus allocation would be Ei = 1, Ej = W 0 = 0 : the
enfranchisement of W; on its own has no real e¤ect since any decision who attribute an
allocation di¤erent than the one in oligarchy would be rejected by the stronger elite and
renegotiated.
Democracy at t = 0
Next, we study the choice of democracy at t = 0. To simplify notation, let f(1)  f and
g(1)  g. As the two elites are identical ex-ante, both of them will agree to a democracy
if and only if the inequality holds:
1
2
u(1) +
1
2
u(0)  1
2
u(1  g   f) + 1
2
u(g) . (3)
We can therefore state
Proposition 3 A necessary condition for E1 and E2 to democratize is that both elites are
risk-averse. When both elites are risk-averse and f is small enough (relative to the degree
of risk-aversion of u(:)), the transition to democracy is Pareto e¢ cient. .
Proof. See appendix.
Consider the case where individuals are risk neutral. In this case, as there are no gains
from risk-sharing and f > 0, the expected utility of either elite at t = 0 (before their
relative bargaining power is revealed) in oligarchy is higher than the expected utility in
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democracy. However, when elites are risk averse, there is a net gain in having a smoother
consumption pattern across the two states, therefore, when f is not too large relative to
degree of risk-aversion, the expected utility in Democracy could well be strictly higher than
the expected utility in Oligarchy.
Furthermore, we note that the equilibrium democratic allocation is Ei = 1   g   f ,
Ej = g and W = f and that the only requirement for f is to be strictly positive (by
assumption 2), i.e. f can be innitesimally small. This implies that in our model the
surplus allocated to the non elite in democracy can in principle be very small.
2.3 Discussion
What is the role of the timing of organization formation in obtaining our main result?
We have assumed that individuals in W form a organization at t = 0 before the elites
know their own relative bargaining power. We argue that no other timing makes sense and
given the choice of when to form a organization, organization formation will take place at
t = 0. Suppose organization formation takes place after elites know their relative bargaining
strength. Then, the stronger elite will always have an incentive to increase c in order to
prevent organization formation and thus coalition formation between the weaker elite and
individuals in W . In our model, the cost c of organization membership is a sunk cost and
organization members pay it only once at the time the organization is formed. What in
e¤ect, we are assuming, is that the stronger elite will nd too costly to break-up an existing
organization already formed at t = 0: if it doesnt then, of course, the organization in W
will be broken up and democratization will reversed. Therefore, given the choice of when
to form a organization, organization formation will take place at t = 0.
Is our main result robust to repeated interaction between competing elites?
On the face of it, folk theorem type arguments suggest that repeated interaction between
competing elites in Oligarchy, should lead to e¢ cient risk sharing between elites. However,
there are at least two reasons why a folk theorem type argument may not apply here. First,
the discount factor may be bounded away from 1 because, for instance, the gap between
successive rounds of play (in our model, in Oligarchy, a round of play would have an ex-
ante stage and ex-post stage of coalition formation and bargaining) is large. Second, the
strategy proles that support risk-sharing between elites may not be renegotiation-proof.
Indeed, in our paper, there is a single e¢ cient risk-sharing allocation between the two
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elites namely that at each value of , each elite appropriates half the social surplus in each
round of play. Notice that for a strategy prole to be renegotiation proof, it would have
to result in the e¢ cient allocation after any history of play. However, any strategy prole
that supports e¢ cient risk-sharing along the equilibrium path of play must involve some
payo¤ loss for the stronger elite in the continuation game that follows on from the history
where the stronger elite reneges on e¢ cient risk-sharing, a contradiction.
3 Elite conict without democracy
In this section, in contrast to the preceding analysis, we examine two di¤erent scenarios
where intra-elite conict doesnt necessarily lead to democratization: vertical biases in
coalition formation and dominant elites.
3.1 Ethnic conict
As already argued in the introduction, intra-elite conict doesnt necessarily lead to stable
democracy, especially when decolonization generates states that are populated by di¤erent
social groups characterized by strong vertical links (like ethnic and linguistic links). In
what follows, we show that with vertical bias, the conditions for democracy to emerge in
equilibrium, derived in the preceding two sections, need to be qualied.
We model ethnic groups and ethnic conict as follows. Assume that W is partitioned
into subgroups W1 and W2 , such that each individual in Wi is that gets a negative utility
 bi, where bi > 0, whenever it forms a coalition with elite Ej; otherwise, (for example, if it
doesnt form a coalition, or if it forms a coalition with elite Ei, j 6= i), bi = 0. We assumed
that individuals have incentive to act collectively when anticipating a coalition with the
weaker elite, u(f) > c. However, if u(f) < c: + bi, for all c 2 fc; cg, clearly no individual
in Wi will form a coalition with Ej; and, assuming that the size of group Wi is greater
than half, then for  = i; the fraction of individuals who act collectively is less than 1
2
and
therefore, there will be no organization formation inW , no ex-post coalition formation and
consequently, no ex-ante democracy.
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3.2 Dominant elites
Moore (1964) observes that the presence of a dominant elite results in dictatorship, not
democracy. One way to model a dominant elite in our setting is to let the ex-ante probability
that  = 1 be q  1
2
. In other words, the two elites are not ex-ante symmetric in the sense
that there is a bias in the probability with which one of the two elites become dominant.
In such a situation, even when we maintain the assumptions under which Proposition 1
is valid, as long as q close enough to 1, there will be no unanimous agreement to extend
democracy. The relevant inequality that needs to be satised for the dominant elite to
agree to democracy is
qu(1) + (1  q)u(0)  qu(1  g   f) + (1  q)u(g) (4)
and as f > 0, when q = 1, the direction of inequality (4) will be reversed and by continuity,
this reversal will persist when q is close to 1. Of course, at the other extreme, when q is
close to 1
2
, by continuity if (3) holds as a strict inequality so will (4). Moreover, as the
LHS of (4) is increasing in q and the RHS of (3) is monotone in q, there is a q > 1
2
and
q < 1, such that when q  q, (3) holds while when q > q, the direction of the inequality is
reversed.
4 Some empirical patterns
In this section we provide and discuss empirical evidence that supports the formal analysis
developed here. To this end, it is useful to state four patterns that emerge from our formal
analysis:
1. In the absence of ethnic bias, intra-elite conict between equally powerful elites is a
precondition for the transition to democracy;
2. Democracy lowers the cost of, and promotes, political activity;
3. The bargaining power of a fully organized non-elite is small i.e. the non-elite median
voter is weak;
4. The transition to democracy doesnt rely on interest alignment between sections of
the elites and non elites following on from modern capitalistic development.
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Only point 4 needs more explanation. An important literature links the transition to
democracy with modern industrial development as in Lizzeri and Persico (2004), Llavador
and Oxoby (2005) and Galor and Moav (2006). In these papers, the transition to democ-
racy is driven by class complementarity or interest alignment between sections of the elite
and non-elite, which follows the modern capitalistic development. In contrast, in our pa-
per, neither technological change nor a di¤erent mix of production factors are needed to
generate the coalition among classes leading democracy. Therefore from our model pattern
4 emerges, in the sense that economic development in itself is neither a su¢ cient nor a
necessary element for the emergence of democracy.22 Accordingly, in this section we argue
that this pattern (as well as the other 3 listed above) has some empirical anecdotal support.
4.1 Pattern 1: Intra-elite conict and coalitions
Collier (1999) classies three di¤erent patterns which historically led to democratization:
i) middle sector mobilization, ii) electoral support mobilization and iii) joint project. In ii),
democratization is the outcome of bargaining between political elites and he considers the
following cases: Switzerland 1848, Chile 1847/41 , Britain 1867 and 1884, Norway 1898,
Italy 1912, Uruguay 1918. In i) the democratization is an outcome of the conict between
political elite and economically rising middle-class (what we can consider as economical
elites). This is the case of: Denmark 1849, Greece 1864, France 1848 and 1875, Argentina
1912, Portugal 1911 and 1918, Spain 1868, 1890 and 1931. In iii), where the working
class played an active role alongside one of the two elites, Collier includes, Denmark 1915,
Finland 1906 and 1919, Sweden 1907 and 1918, Netherlands 1917, Belgium 1918, Germany
1918, Britain 1918.
In what follows we analyze, in detail, some of these cases and also the establishment of
democracy to India, a case that has received surprisingly little attention from the literature.
European Countries
There is some agreement among historians and political scientists that the elites in
22This is not to say that development and democracy are completely unrelated. In our model democracy
and development can be linked by the fact that economic development can be associated with the rise of
strong industrial elite able to compete with traditional rural landowning. aristocracy.
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Britain had conicting interests. Olson (1993) traces the origin of such fragmentation in
the English civil war in the 17th century and writes. There were no lasting winners in the
English civil wars. The di¤erent tendencies in British Protestantism and the economic and
social forces with which they were linked were more or less evenly matched. The political
environment after the Glorious Revolution led to the competition between rural aristocracy
and industrial capital (Olson 1993), which paved the way for franchise extension in the mid-
Nineteenth century. Moore (1966) claims instead that this division was the result of the
British capitalistic evolution, where part of the landed upper class and the gentry who
transformed themselves into capitalists generated a di¤erent and equally strong elite, the
upper bourgeoisie.23
The British parliament prior to 1832 was dominated either directly or indirectly by
the big landlords. The 1832 Reform act established the right to vote based uniformly on
property and income. It extended franchise to 14% of male population, roughly the entire
middle class (Smellie 1949 and Collier 1999). The 1832 act gave the de jure power to a
section of the economic elite who were unrepresented under existing electoral arrangements.
We may argue that it avoided the alliance between bourgeoisie and working class that 44
years before leaded in France to the revolution. Accordingly, the landscape after the reform
of 1832 was the one described by our model with two conicting elites, who represented in
the parliament by the Conservatives and the Liberalsagreed to extend, with the largely
bipartisan reform of 1867, franchise to a large part of the working class, a task that was
completed by the reform in 1888 when about 60% of male adult were enfranchised.
The turmoil of the French revolution and the restoration of monarchy following the
Vienna Congress resulted, in France, in a social environment dominated by two elites with
conicting interests. One elite, supporting the Republican party, mainly consisted of indus-
trialists and professionals, and the other elite, mainly consisting of landowners, supported
the monarchist party, while the working class was weak and still not organized (Elwitt
(1975) pp. 5 and Luebbert (1991) pp. 37). In this context an episode can illustrate the
bargaining relationship emphasized in the model: universal male su¤rage was introduced
in France 1848. When a social reform agenda was passed thanks to the alliance between
the working class and republicans, a conservative government disenfranchised 2.8 million
23The political struggles related to the Corn Laws are often presented as the most evident sign of the
division among industrialist and rural elites.
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of men in 1850. However, in 1851 the Republicans and the working class supported the
coup led by Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, who restored the universal su¤rage, initially only
formally and from 1868, under the pressure of Republicans and working classes more sub-
stantially by establishing the freedom of organization previously banned (Collier 1999, pp.
42-43 and Elwitt pp. 41).
Unlike France and Britain, Italy, Germany and Japan did not pass through historical
episodes that weakened the traditional aristocracy and created conditions leading to intra-
elite competition. In fact, the landed aristocracy was strengthened by their involvement
in reunication process both in Germany and in Italy and by prestigious external military
victories in Japan. Therefore, in all these three countries, the landed aristocracy was
still dominant in the second half on nineteenth century. The oligarchic structure in Italy,
Germany and Japan was mainly achieved through an incorporation of a weak bourgeoisie
in an authoritarian state, and the landed aristocracy was still hegemonic in this alliance
...a commercial and industrial class which is too weak and dependent to take the power
and rule in its own right [...] throws itself into the arms of the landed aristocracy and the
royal bureaucracy. (Moore (1964), pp. 435-437).
In Germany, Bismarcks so called revolution from above (Moore 1962, pp. 433) was
a strategy to preserve the conservative absolutist order, in his own words to "overthrow
parliaments with parliamentary means". Popular participation in the Germany government
was strongly mitigated by institutional restrictions and the voting system was controlled
by the Junker landlords. Similarly, mainly rural oligarchies governed in Italy and Japan
until the establishment of their respective fascist governments between the 1920s and the
1930s, and after short-lived weak democracies (the Weimar Republic, the Taisho¯ democracy
in Japan, and Giolittis governments in Italy). All main political gures: Bismarck in
Germany, Cavour in Italy and the statesmen of the Meiji era embodied the interests of
the landed aristocracy, and were deep conservative loyalists themselves. Even during the
subsequent dictatorships, the landed aristocracy often maintained a strong position.24
India
India is the worlds biggest and one of its more stable democracies. In the more than
24In Italy for example, fascist leaders used to declare that fascism was "ruralizing Italy" and Mussolini
promoted an strongly autarchic economic policy "la battaglia del grano" (the battle of wheat) throughout
his rule.
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50 years since the rst election, there have been 15 general elections and over 300 state
elections. Both at the state level and at the centre, governments have always been elected
by people with a reasonably high level of rotation among political organizations.25 As
it has been extensively documented, India enjoys a free media, freedom of assembly and
association.
The decision to extend the franchise was voted unanimously by the constituent assembly,
which also declared India an Independent state. The constituent assembly was elected via a
process of indirect elections, organized in provincial legislatures elected in early 1946, using
the 1935 act of franchise, mainly based on landowning. The electors constituted about 10
percent of the entire population (Sarkar 2001). Therefore, the constituent assembly can be
considered to be representative of the elites and franchise extension in India was a one-shot
decision rather than a dynamic process.
At the onset of the constituent assembly, the elites were constituted by large landown-
ers and the industrial urban class often in conict within each other. These divisions were
already present in the Moguls era but they were further exacerbated by the English rulers,
who implemented the policy of "divide and rule", trying to prevent the formation of any
coalition that could represent a threat . British rulers favoured and rested mainly on the
support of Indian rural upper classes: native princes and large landlords.26 In contrast,
British colonialism did not favour Indian commercial and industrial elites, to prevent com-
petition with their English counterparts who, for long time, sought protection, subsidy, and
opportunities for monopolistic exploitation of the Indian market (Moore 1966, pp 371). This
bias toward rural elites alienated the commercial and professional class generated a clear
split between rural and urban elites in India. Accordingly, the British strategy resulted in
the fact that the urban elite did not form a coalition with the powerful landed aristocracy,
in a fashion which generated the dictatorial drift in Japan, Italy and Germany. The conict
between urban intellectual elites and rural big and medium farmers is a common element
present in the history of Indian Democracy.
In this respect India di¤ered from Pakistan. Geographically, Pakistan consists of regions
25Although the Congress has traditionally been the dominating force, in 1977 it is thrown out. In 1980
it was voted back and in 1989 elections it was voted out again. In 1991, the Congress came back to power
again.
26In the most important court there was a British resident advisor.
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which- during British colonialism- were characterized by mainly rural economy, dominated
by Muslim Punjabi landlords.27 The Punjabi elites, consisting mainly of the landed aris-
tocracy (e.g. Kohli, 2001, pp. 5) were the core of the Muslim League who decided the
constitutional design of the country, and obtained partition from the rest of India. Al-
though the creation of Pakistani democracy was contemporaneous with Indian democracy,
it has never been stable with four major military coups (1958, 1969, 1977, 1999).
The following episode is a useful illustration of the coalition dynamics underlined in
our model. Indira Gandhis attempt to mount a coup (by imposing "Emergency") in 1975
culminated with the lost of the enormous popular support she had hitherto enjoyed and
indeed, she called and lost elections in 1977. Even though she promised more redistribution
to the non elite, this commitment was not credible and an alliance consisting of the non-elite
with anti-Congress parties opposed her.28
The degree of ethnic conict in India has always been less serious than for example in
African countries. The fact that the Congress organization and the coalition of organiza-
tions in power at the central government during the di¤erent legislatures are not organized
on an ethnic basis supports this claim (Horowitz 1985). Indeed, we showed that if part of
non elites say Wi, have ethnic linkages with part of the elites Ei; and for these reasons Wi
has some non monetary disutility bi in allying with Ej; j 6= i, democracy will not emerge
in equilibrium when bi is large. The lower level of inter-ethnic conict in Indian society is
perhaps due to the geographic dispersion of Indian ethnic groups, which made them eco-
nomically complementary and lower the level of b. And perhaps due to sanskritisation and
castes institutions, which to a certain extend reect horizontal divisions rather than verti-
cal ethnic-type division. On the contrary, when di¤erent ethnic groups are concentrated in
di¤erent regions of the country, it is more likely that non-elites will not ally horizontally
with each other, but prefer to ally vertically with the elites of the same ethnic group.
In Nigeria after independence three essentially ethnic organizations had emerged: the
Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) drawing its support from the Hausa and Fulani tribes
of the North, the Action Group (AG), drawing its support from the Yoruba tribes of West-
27Until 1971, the presence of a Bengali-muslim population in Pakistan generated a conict with the west
Pakistani majority, but their political power has always been small (Rashiduzzaman 1982). In 1971, the
Bengali minority, with the help of India, obtained their independence with the formation of Bangladesh.
28Kohli (2001) notes: "The fact that she was voted out of power following the emergency only conrm
the e¢ cacy of Indian democracy".
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ern Nigeria, and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) relying on
the support of the Igbo of Eastern Nigeria. This clear regional divide was inherited from
the British colonial period, where the South East, the South West and the North admin-
istrations were in practice ruled as fully independent units.29 Interestingly, community
identities were so strong in shaping economic participation and social di¤erentiation that
a clear divide between classes did not emerge (Forrest pp. 24, 1993). Furthermore, we note
that these three macro-regions are still today economically autonomous entities, predom-
inantly agrarian in terms of employed labor force (more than 70 percent). The two rainy
southern regions is where, historically, the production of staple tree and root crops is con-
centrated while the drier north is where the production of grains is concentrated (Olaloku
et al. 1979).
The vertical ethnical division resulted, in Nigeria, in a series unstable democratic
regimes. The rst elections held in Nigeria in 1959 saw the victory of the NPC, which
after one year declared the state of emergency in the western region whose local govern-
ment, leaded by the AG, was proscribed and its leader arrested. The non elites, did not
reject this outcome and instead of turning compact against the elites who disenfranchised
them, they split along the ethnic and geographic lines, which lead the country to a long
civil war that lasted until 1970 (Ake 1985).
4.2 Pattern 2: The cost and organization of political activity
It is quite incontroversial that democracy does not prevent and, on the contrary, encour-
ages collective political activity. The constitutions of all main democracies dedicate one
important article to the freedom of association or (/and) organization formation. In what
follows we provide a sample consisting of the oldest and largest democracies.
 Canada: constitution act article 2 point d, guarantees freedom of association.
 France: article 4 (Title I) states Political organizations and groups shall contribute
to the exercise of su¤rage. They shall be formed and carry on their activities freely
(...).
29The nationalistic party that after the independence forced the creation of a single state.
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 Germany, article 9 (freedom of association) states All Germans have the right to
form associations and societies.
 Japan, article 21, (...) Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press
and all other forms of expression are guaranteed (...).
 India, article 19 point c , freedom to form associations or unions;
 Italy, article 18 (freedom of association) Citizens have the right freely and without
authorization to form associations for those aims not forbidden by criminal law.
 Turkey, article 33, Everyone has the right to form associations, or become a member
of an association, or withdraw from membership without prior permission..
 US: 1st amendment, (...) the right of the people peaceably to assemble (...).
On the other side, Dahl (1989, p. 241) for the period 1981-85 classies 85 countries (out
of 168) as completely non democratic and notice that 70 among them have a total control
of non-state collective organizations.
European Countries
In Great Britain, after the 1867 Reform Act, parties began to organize themselves as
mass organizations and create institutions needed to compete at a national level (Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2006, p. 179). Several small socialist groups had formed around this time
with the intention of linking the movement to political policies. Among these were the
Independent Labour Party, the intellectual and largely middle-class Fabian Society, the
Social Democratic Federation and the Scottish Labour Party, this leads in 1900 to the
formation of the Labour Representation Committee a centralized parties representing the
working class. Furthermore, mass mobilization was achieved also through the creation of the
national Union of Conservative Associations in 1867, and the National Liberal Federation
in 1877, with the aim of coordinating and organizing local associations constituted mainly
by workmens classes (Beattie 1970, pp. 138-144).30
30Taken literally, our model explains the formation of a single party for the non elites, but this is only
the result of simplifying assumptions. In principle, non-elite can organize themselves in di¤erent bodies
and also by joining preexisting parties, this would not change the nature of our results to the extent that
the resulting organizations successfully coordinate to mobilize the non-elites in case of disenfranchisement
threats.
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In France, the elections in 1848 under manhood universal su¤rage, prompted the for-
mation of the rst mass organization, Republican Solidarity. This organization established
branches in sixty-two of Francess eighty-six departments and rapidly acquired about thirty-
thousand members in 353 branches and it was formed by bourgeois, petty bourgeois and
working class (Aminzade .1993, pp. 29-32).31 Interestingly, Luis Napoleon during the initial
repressive years of his regime declared Republican Solidarity illegal, but he never restricted
su¤rage. Republican Solidarity then almost disappeared, but it was revived with success
in 1868, when Napoleon restored the formal democracy by removing the ban to any form
of collective political activity.
India
The mass mobilization in India is a more complicated phenomenon than in the western
European countries since it is inherently linked with the nationalistic and anticolonial
movement. The Congress party, founded at the end of the nineteenth century became
a mass organization after the rst World War, in large part due to Gandhi. It is also
interesting to notice that the Lahore demand for independence in 1929 was accompanied
by a sharpening of the notion of democracy. The Nehru Report of 1928 suggested adult
franchise and from the Faizpur session of 1936 onwards the Congress made a Constituent
assembly elected by universal su¤rage one of its central demands (Sarkar 2001, p. 29).
4.3 Pattern 3: The weak median voter
European Countries
A necessary condition for the democratization is that the ability of the working class
to extract surplus is limited and that the organized working class on its own is weak (and
becomes powerful only if allied with one elite). This is clearly consistent with Przeworski
(1997) who notes:
Here it may be worth noting that democratic system was solidied in Bel-
gium, Sweden, France and Great Britain only after organized workers were badly
defeated in mass strikes and adopted a docile posture as a result.,(Przeworski
(1997, p. 133)
31For example in the city of Toulouse the most outspoken republican militants were: 55% belonging to
the working class, 21% bourgeois and 21% petty bourgeois.
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In the UK, the enfranchised classes represented in the parliament by the Conservatives
and the Liberals agreed to extend, with the reform of 1867, franchise to a large part of the
working class, a task that was completed by the reform in 1888 when about 60% of male
adult were enfranchised. In general this second wave of enfranchisement does not seem
to be due to the strength of the working class. On the contrary, there is some agreement
that the working class in England was too weak to represent a serious threat as Lizzeri and
Persico (2004) argue. The democratic demand from the lower class was represented by the
Chartist movement, whose revolutionary power had its peak in the demonstration of 1848
that was brutally crushed. Therefore, one can argue that the Chartist movement did not
necessarily entail a real chance of revolution in Britain (Wende 1999, pp. 147).
Similarly in France during the Pariscommune, where the urban working classwithout
the alliance of the Republicansseized the power and governed Paris for few months was
crushed by the troops of the Third Republic, which supports the claim, also put forward by
Elwitt (1975) and Luebbert (1991), on the weakness of the working class as an autonomous
force in France.
What about the ex-post capacity (the political power) of surplus extraction of the me-
dian voter in the European countries in the period immediately after the democratization?
Democracy spreads in most of the Western Europe in the period 1830-1920. Aidt, Dutta
and Loukoianova (2006) analyze 12 European countries in this period and nd that en-
franchisement generated low increases in welfare expenditure and a shift of the government
expenditure from justice and police to infrastructure provision. The low increase in wel-
fare expenditure seems consistent with claim that the de facto power of the working class
remained low after enfranchisement.
India
Indian democracy has done very little to increase the living standard of the majority of
Indian citizens. As Weiner notes:
The incorporation into the political system of backward caste elites and
members of scheduled castes has apparently done little to reduce the enormous
social and economic disparities that persist in Indias hierarchical and inegal-
itarian social order. That raises the fundamental question: if there are now
so many OBC and scheduled castes bureaucrats and politicians, why is not re-
ected in state policies to promote the well being of their communities? (...)
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Why has the increase in political power for members of the lower castes done
so little to raise these communities?(Weiner (2001) pp 211).
Weiners observations are supported by Figure 4, depicting the index of wealth concen-
tration and relative poverty in India from 1946- the date of the constituent assembly, which
allowed for universal su¤rage- to the early 1990s.32 We can observe that income inequality
and relative poverty has no downward tendlittle or no redistribution has taken place.33
Altogether, the funds allocated for the three main antipoverty programs constituted only
the 4% of the total allocation in the plan where this project took place.34
Furthermore, we can observe very little evidence of extensive education provision; the
share of individuals above 25 years that completed the rst level is very low, 6.3% in 1960,
11 years after the rst election. And it does not appear to be much higher in 1990, 8.5%,
after 41 years of democracy.35 Moreover there is a widespread consensus that level of health
care is persistently neglected in many part of India. For example, Sen (1995) states:
If we were to look back at what has happened in India in the rst four
decades of planned development, two general failures appear particularly glar-
ing. First, in contrast with what was promised by the political leadership which
took India to independence, very little has been achieved in "the ending of
poverty and ignorance and disease and inequality of opportunity" [...]. Four
decades of allegedly "interventionist" planning did little to make the country
literate, provide a wide-based health service, achieve comprehensive land re-
forms, or end the rampant social inequalities that blight the material prospects
of the underprivileged.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
The policy after independence mainly favoured agrarian, industrial and professional
urban elites. The agrarian reform was not redistributive; there was a transfer of ownership
from absentee landlords to enterprising rich farmers, who beneted also from policy of price
32Gini index and last income quintile: Deininger and Squire, High quality Dataset. GDP per capita
growth: Penn Table.
33Deininger and Squire, High quality Dataset.
34Brass 1990.
35Barro and Lee Dataset.
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support, subsidized inputs and institutional credits (Bardhan pp. 46 1988).36 Substantial
help was also addressed to industrialists, mainly from a few top Western Indian business
families, with strong protectionist policies of import substitution, trade restriction, and
large public provision of capital goods, intermediate goods, infrastructural facilities for
private rms often at articially low prices (Bardhan pp. 41-47). Also the professionals
and high level bureaucrats were favoured by the government policy. In a country were the
illiteracy is so widespread, this class beneted from educational expenditure. In India, total
expenditure on education has been generally lower than comparable developing countries
and a disproportionate share of the education budget has gone into higher education and to
provide grants-in-aid to private schools with very little left for primary education (Weiner
1999, pp. 214). This policy favoured the educated urban classes by helping their children for
secondary education and maintaining their monopoly as human capital owners (Bardhan,
1988 pp. 52).
There is a high level of fragmentation of lower castes. The caste system was an insti-
tutional way to organize this fragmentation, but at the same time, it perpetrated these
divisions. A proof of this political weakness is represented by the general weakness of the
Communist organizations in India. They have never been strong at a central level, and,
when they gained power at the state level, as in West Bengal, they have always supported
moderate policies of redistribution rather than dramatic change in the economic system.
Therefore, we can argue that Indian lower classes would never be able to have an high level
of bargaining power on its own (i:e:f is su¢ ciently small).
4.4 Pattern 4: Growth and democracy
Is democracy linked to industrial development? The evidence on this issue is moot. There
is a relatively old debate on the so-called "modernization theory" that democratization
naturally follows the development process. This was initially fuelled by an article of Lipset
(1959) subsequently criticized by Luebbert (1991) and ODonnel (1973) among others. O
Donnel , in particular, argues that the collapse of democracy in Latin-America in the 1960s
and 1970s undermined the condence in the modernization-promoted democracy. The In-
36By 1975 the big farmers (more than 4 hec) constituting 19 percent of the rural population accounted
for 60 percent of cultivated area.
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dian experience (at least till the late 1980s) provides an example of a reasonably stable
democracy in an stagnating economy (in gure 1 we show the Indian GDP growth rate
until 1990). Furthermore, if is true that in some western countries like Britain, Sweden and
France, the process of industrialization was closely associated with a process of democra-
tization, it is also true that in some other countries like Germany, Italy and Japan equally
impressive episodes of industrialization led to totalitarian regimes. Consistently with this
observation, recent empirical evidence casts serious doubt on the causality from economic
development to democratization (Przeworski et. al. (2000), Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson,
Yared (2005), and Persson and Tabellini (2006)).37
5 Final Remarks
The following quote is a good way of summarizing our main result:
In a country where the elements in the dominant coalition are diverse,
and each su¢ ciently strong to exert pressures and pulls in di¤erent directions,
political democracy may have slightly better chance, than in other developing
countries,(...). This is based not so much on the strength of the liberal value
system in its political culture as on the procedural usefulness of democracy as
an impersonal (at least arbitrary) rule of negotiation, demand articulation and
bargaining within coalition, and as a device by which one partner may keep the
other partners at the bargaining table within some moderate boundsBardhan
(1984, p.77).
In particular, our model claries how democracy can be seen as a negotiation device
by which competing elites ensure a mutually fair share of the surplus by handing formal
power to a weak non-elite median voter.
Possible directions for future research include investigating, more generally, voting mod-
els with an endogenously weak median voter, understanding the provision of and funding
of public goods with a weak median voter and studying the link between secessionist move-
ments and democratic institutions.
37Other contributions such as Barro (1999), Boix and Stokes (2003), Bueno De Mesquita et al.(2003),
Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer (2005), reach contradictory conclusions.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of lemma 1
We use the idea of a stochastically stable equilibrium developed by Young (1993) (see also
Charness and Jackson (2007)). Let g be an arbitrary nite normal form game with a set
of N players, an action set Ai for each player and a payo¤ function ui : i=Ni=1 Ai ! <.
Suppose each player believes that whenever any other player chooses to play a specic
action, with probability ", 0 < " < 1, she ends up choosing some other action in Ai. Let
g(") denote the perturbed game. A state in g(") is a prole of actions. For each state, let
each player pick a best response to that state in g("). Associated with each best-response is
a function  from the set of states to itself. When " is small enough, let the set of 0s that
remain best responses for all smaller " be denoted by A(g). Any  2 A(g), together with "
denes a Markov process over the set of states that is both irreducible and aperiodic and
therefore has a unique steady-state distribution. A stochastically stable state is one which
has positive probability under the limit of the steady state distribution of the preceding
Markov process as " goes to zero for any selection  2 A(g). If a state is both a Nash
equilibrium of g and a stochastically stable, then it is said to be a stochastically stable
equilibrium of g.
As matters stand, we cant apply, in a straightforward way, the denition of a stochasti-
cally stable equilibrium to select between the two equilibria in the coordination game played
by non-party members inW . The reason for this is that there is a continuum of individuals,
of unit measure, in W while the denition of stochastic stability presupposes a game with
a nite number of players. Instead, we take a sequence of nite subsets of players in W
(equivalently, a nite grid contained in the unit interval) whose limit is W (equivalently,
whose limit is the unit interval). Let ~Nj, j  1; be a sequence of nite grids contained in
the unit interval so that limj!1 ~Nj = [0; 1]. Let Nj = # ~Nj. We call a sequence of nite
grids admissible if (i) there is a threshold Nj for each j such that limj!1
Nj
Nj
= ^(c):, (ii)
the payo¤ to a party member is u(f)   c if the number party members is greater than or
equal to Nj and is  c otherwise, (iii) the payo¤ to a non-party member is zero. For an
equilibrium to be stochastically stable in the coordination game played by individuals in
W , it must be the limit of the sequence of stochastically stable equilibria of all admissible
sequences of nite grids converging to the unit interval.
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Fix j and consider ~Nj. For ~" small enough, if at least Nj individuals join the party,
then the best response of each non-party member must be to choose join the party as well.
Similarly, if at most N 1 join the party, then the best response of each non-party member
must be to join the party. Let #Npj be the number of party members. In states where
#Npj =
Nj   1, choosing either of the two options, join the party or not join the party,
are possible best responses for an individual. It follows that that best responses di¤er only
in states where #Npj = Nj   1. Now, consider the associated Markov process for small
~". There are two recurrent communication classes38, one where all individuals choose to
join the party (labelled a1) and one in which all individuals choose not to join the party
(labelled a2). By Theorem 4 in Young (1993), only states in a recurrent communication
class with least resistance will have positive probability weight in the limit of the steady
state distribution of the Markov process as ~" goes to zero. Consider the state a2. Then,
(i) there is a best response selection such that given Nj   Nj + 2 errors, the best response
of each individual is to be in a1 and (ii) there is a best response selection such that given
Nj   Nj + 1 errors, the best response of each individual is to be in a1. Therefore, the
minimum resistance of leaving the state a2, depending on the selection made, is either
N   N +1 or N   N +2. It follows that the minimum resistance of a tree oriented from the
state a2 to the state a1, depending on the best response selection made, is either Nj  Nj+1
or Nj  Nj+2. Next, consider the state a1. Then, (i) there is a best response selection such
that given Nj   1 errors, the best response of each individual is to be in a2 and (ii) there is
a best response selection such that given Nj 2 errors, the best response of each individual
is to be in a2. Therefore, the minimum resistance of leaving the state a1, depending on the
best response selection is either Nj 1 or Nj 2. It follows that the minimum resistance of
a tree oriented from the state a1 to the state a2, depending on the best response selection
made, is also either Nj   1 or Nj   2. The state a1 is the unique stochastically stable
equilibrium if and only if both Nj   Nj + 1 < Nj   1 and Nj   Nj + 2 < Nj   2 or
equivalently, both Nj >
Nj+2
2
and Nj >
Nj+4
2
. As Nj+2
2
>
Nj+4
2
, if Nj   2 > Nj2 , the state a1
is the unique stochastically stable equilibrium. Rewriting these inequalities, it follows that
state a1 is the unique stochastically stable equilibrium if and only if
Nj 2
Nj
> 1
2
. As j !1,
for any admissible sequence of nite grids,
Nj 2
Nj
! ^(c): and therefore, when ^(c) > 1
2
, the
38For the denition of the terms "recurrent communication classes", "resistance" and "minimum sto-
chastic potential" in this proof, see Young (1993).
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unique stochastically stable equilibrium is one where all non-party members do not join
the party or equivalently, when ^(c:) < 1
2
, the unique stochastically stable equilibrium is
one where all non-party members join the party.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Inequality (3) is equivalent to
Z 1
1 g f
u0(x)dx 
Z g
0
u0(x)dx: (5)
When both elites are risk-neutral i.e. u00(:) = 0, by computation, it follows that as 1  
(1  g   f) = g + f > g, the direction of the inequality (3) is always reversed. Therefore,
risk-aversion is a necessary condition for equilibrium enfranchisement. However, when
u00(:) < 0, as 1  (1  g) = g and 0 < g,
Z g
0
u0(x)dx >
Z 1
1 g
u0(x)dx
and therefore, as long as f is small enough, (3) will hold.
6.3 Endogenising the grabbing function
We show how the grabbing function can be endogenously derived as the outcomes of a
process of sequential bilateral Nash bargains, where rst, a coalition of two classes bargains
with a class and second, given the surplus appropriated at the proceeding stage, each class
in the coalition bargains with each other.
For each pair of coalitions ,0, 0 2   (), we model the raw force of a coalition by
its disagreement function d;0(). Measuring the surplus  is able to appropriate in the
event of civil war against 0: Moreover, for each  2   and 0 2   (), there is a continuous
function c : [0; 1] ! [0; 1] with d0;() = c (d;0()) such that whenever 0 < d;0() < 1,
d;0() + c (d;0()) < 1 but limd;0 ()!1 c (d;0()) = 0 and limd;0 ()!0 c (d;0()) = 1
so that there is surplus destruction after the civil war but the surplus destruction is
minimal when one coalition or class completely overwhelms the other. Finally, we as-
sume that both dfW ;Ejg;fEig (i) and dfWg;fEig () are continuous and increasing in  with
lim!0 dfWg;fEjg (i) = 0 and lim!0 dfW ;Ejg;fEig (i) = dfEjg;fEig (i).
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Our analysis of sequential Nash bargaining proceeds by backward induction. First, when
both ; 0 each consists of a single class (labelled as k; l), and the available social surplus
is s > 0, the Nash bargaining outcome is the solution to the maximization problem:
max
ck;cl
(u(gks)  u(dfkg;flgs))
 
u(gls)  u(dflg;fkgs)

At an interior solution, the rst-order conditions characterizing the solution to this maxi-
mization problem is:
u0(gks)
(u(gks)  u(dfkg;flgs)) =
u0((1  gk)s) 
u((1  gk)s)  u(dflg;fkgs)

Note that when dfkg;flg increases the LHS of the proceeding equality increases and there-
fore, as u00(:) < 0, gk must increase to maintain equality. Therefore, gk, viewed as function
of dfkg;flg and dflg;fkg, is continuous in both arguments, increasing in dfkg;flg but decreas-
ing in dflg;fkg. Moreover, if dfkg;flg > dflg;fkg, gk > gl. As dfkg;flg ! 0, by assumption,
limdl;k()!0 c (dl;k()) = 1 and therefore, in the limit, gk ! 0 and gl ! 1.
Next, we dene the "utility function" of a coalition of classes fk; lg as the value function
Vfk;lg (s) derived from the solution to the Nash Bargaining maximization problem between
k; l for a xed s. Note that by standard results in duality, Vfk;lg (s) is an increasing,
concave function of s. When the coalition fk; lg bargains with the class fmg, then the
Nash bargaining outcome is the solution to the following maximization problem:
max
ci
(u(gm)  u(dfmg;fk;lg)))
 
Vfk;lg
 
gfk;lg
  V(dfk;lg;fmg))
At an interior solution, the FOC is:
u0(gm)
(u(gm)  u(dfmg;fk;lg))) =
V 0fk;lg(1  gm) 
Vfk;lg (1  gm)  V(dfk;lg;fmg))

Using arguments identical to those used before, gm, viewed as function of dfmg;fk;lg and
dfk;lg;fmg, is continuous in both arguments, increasing in dfmg;fk;lg but decreasing in dfk;lg;fmg
and if dfmg;fk;lg > dfk;lg;fmg, gm > 12 and whenever dfk;lg;fmg ! 0, gfk;lg ! 0 and gm ! 1.
By an appropriate change of notation, dene
g(fkg ; flg ; ) = gk(dfkg;flg () ; dflg;fkg ())
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and
g(fmg ; fk; lg ; ) = gm(dfmg;fk;lg () ; dfk;lg;fmg ()):
It follows that under the assumptions made d;0() so far, we have that (i) g(; 0; ) =
1 g(0; ; ), (ii) g(Ej; Ei; i) < g(Ei; Ej; i), (iii) lim!0 g(W ; Ei; ) = 0 and lim!0 g(fW ; Ejg ; Ei; i) =
g(Ej; Ei; i), (iv) both g (fW ; Eig ; Ej; ) and g(W ; Ei; ) are increasing in  and nally,
(v) f() is continuous in :
Therefore, all the properties of the g(; 0; ) used in the text can be derived by a process
of sequential Nash bargaining.
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